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Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to represent, 
reason about and conceptualize mental states (Malle, 
2002). It is a fundamental factor in explaining human 
behaviour. However, human beings are not born with 
a fully-developed theory of mind system; it develops 
progressively over time.
Initial studies of the development of ToM supported 
the premise that there is a developmental milestone, 
at around four or five years of age, when false belief 
understanding is acquired. Nevertheless, the notion 
of ToM has expanded and it is now considered to be 
a series of processes leading to an increasingly sophis-
ticated understanding of human behaviour. Against 
the backdrop of this broader concept of ToM devel-
opment, the present study assumes that, despite the 
ongoing development of ToM abilities, the acquisi-
tion of false belief understanding is still a landmark. 
Once they have developed false belief understanding, 
children understand that different people represent 
the world in different ways, and may therefore have 
a variety of beliefs or thoughts about the same reality 
(Malle, 2002).
To solve false belief understanding tasks, it must be 
understood that what different people know or believe 
about the world might differ. Understanding false belief 
implies realizing how people construct knowledge, that 
people’s beliefs are based on their knowledge, that 
those beliefs can differ from reality and also that people’s 
behaviour can be predicted from beliefs or mental states 
(Malle, 2002). The development of false belief under-
standing is therefore crucial for the development of 
social cognition.
On the other hand, in this study we also assume that 
language can influence false belief understanding. 
Although several authors (e.g. Astington & Baird, 2005; 
de Villiers, 2005) maintain that language influences 
the development of false belief understanding, others 
defend a bidirectional relationship (Slade & Ruffman, 
2005). It is generally agreed, however, that some aspects 
of such a complex question require further study 
(Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). In the present 
work we adopt a specific approach to the influence 
of language on ToM, focusing on the development of 
false belief understanding and considering the fun-
damental role language plays in it.
Various proposals have been made regarding the 
different aspects of language that may influence ToM. 
The semantic-pragmatic or communicative approach 
emphasizes the role of the language employed to 
address children in the development of ToM. Another 
approach stresses the effects of learning certain aspects 
of grammar on ToM development. And additional data 
show that other aspects of language may also play a 
role in the development of ToM. Therefore, a summary 
of these proposals is provided.
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The semantic-pragmatic approach focuses on the 
effects of the input directed at children. Within this 
approach, there are two principal lines of research: 
(a) Some authors consider that the effects of the input 
are due to the process of conversational interaction 
itself, in that it allows different viewpoints to be shared; 
(b) Other authors hold that ToM development is pro-
moted by the effects of the significance of certain words. 
The first group maintains that children are capable 
of the competent use of psychological terms during 
social interactions mediated by language (Cutting & 
Dunn, 2006; Harris, 2005; Tomasello & Carpenter, 
2007). Considering the large number of studies and 
the quantity of data collected along these lines, it seems 
clear that conversational interactions play a critical 
role in understanding people’s mental worlds. In any 
case, it is still necessary to define what type of con-
versational input is most appropriate to stimulate the 
emergence of ToM, or what aspects of the conversa-
tional input favour this emergence. Most of the studies 
conducted have been correlational and it is thus dif-
ficult to determine whether the type of conversational 
input promotes the development of ToM, or whether 
the child’s level of socio-cognitive understanding 
motivates others to express themselves through a more 
mentalistic discourse. It is important to consider, how-
ever, that the study by Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) 
shows that exposing children to interactive situations 
in which different points of view on the same subject 
are emphasized is sufficient to improve their perfor-
mance on theory of mind tasks.
Other authors who share this communicative 
approach have focused specifically on the semantic 
aspects of conversational input. From this point of view, 
conversations which abound in references to mental con-
tent facilitate the abstraction of mental state concepts 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Olson, 1988). According 
to this perspective, the acquisition of terms that refer 
to mental states is important for developing an under-
standing of the mind, since it makes it possible to draw 
analogies between one’s own experience and that of 
others. Language creates categories of expression to 
distinguish concepts such as beliefs and desires with 
a high degree of referential opacity. However, the 
above mentioned study by Lohmann and Tomasello 
(2003) shows that it is not necessary to use mental-
state language to facilitate the understanding of false 
beliefs, and that a perspective-shifting discourse could 
be enough.
A second theoretical proposal assumes that the lin-
guistic and grammatical abilities of children are critical 
for the development of false belief understanding. 
Syntactic abilities began to be thought of as closely 
associated with false belief understanding following 
the work of Astington and Jenkins (1999). Since then, 
a much more specific hypothesis has been proposed 
(de Villiers, 2005; de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; 
de Villiers & Pyers, 2002), maintaining that the key 
factor when discussing false beliefs resides in the 
use by children of sentential complement syntax. Two 
important aspects of this hypothesis must be empha-
sized. First, it is not applied to all sentential comple-
ments, only to those that depend on mental and 
communication verbs that take complements about 
potentially real events, also called realis complements. 
Unlike realis complements, which can be true or false, 
irrealis complements, characteristic of other mental 
verbs such as promise or want, deal with future or 
hypothetical events, and a specific truth value cannot 
be attributed to them. Second, it has been postulated 
that children first master sentential complements that 
depend on verbs of communication, where there can 
be explicit evidence that the complement is false, and 
that only afterwards, by analogy, do they understand 
the sentential complements embedded in mental verbs 
(for a detailed explanation, see de Villiers, 2005).
Sentential complement sentences are complex sen-
tences consisting of a main clause, into which is inserted 
another sentence (or complement clause), which acts 
as the grammatical object of the main clause. The type of 
sentential complement sentences on which de Villiers’s 
hypothesis (2005) is based is illustrated here:
 (1)  Mike says that the truck is yellow.
 (2)  Sean thought that Charles had broken his truck.
Only this type of complement clause, found in sen-
tences with verbs like think or say as a main verb, can 
be false even though the main clause which contains it 
is true. Sentence 1 may be true, regardless of the veracity 
of the complement clause. The same occurs in example 2. 
If the complement clause “that Charles had broken his 
truck” codifies the mind of Sean, the truthfulness of 
this proposition cannot be assessed by comparing it 
to the real world, but only to Sean’s mental world. 
This property has led some authors to assume that 
sentential complementation provides the necessary 
format to represent false beliefs.
In this context, the study conducted by de Villiers 
and Pyers (2002) is fundamental. In it, a series of linguis-
tic and false belief tasks was administered to children 
between 3 and 5 years of age on four different occa-
sions. The authors found that children’s performance 
in false belief tasks was not related to their general 
linguistic ability measured through mean length of 
utterance (MLU) or other syntactical measures, but 
was exclusively related to the mastery of the structures 
used to express communicative or thought comple-
ment verbs.
One line of research that has provided crucial empirical 
evidence for de Villiers’s sentential complementation 
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hypothesis is based on data obtained from the 
performance of false belief tasks by deaf children. 
Research on false belief understanding in deaf children 
has generally confirmed the importance of children’s 
linguistic abilities for the development of ToM, showing 
that while deaf children born into hearing families 
(non-signing) have difficulties with ToM tasks, deaf 
children with deaf parents (native signers) do not differ 
significantly from hearing children in their responses 
to ToM tasks (Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 2000). Along 
similar lines, Gale, de Villiers, de Villiers, and Pyers 
(1996) found that deaf children educated in hearing 
schools, who, as a result, are delayed in their linguis-
tic development, tend to complete the false belief 
understanding tasks three years later than hearing 
children. When the individual differences in ToM 
development in these children were analysed, it was 
found that control over sentential complement struc-
tures continued to be the best predictor of false belief 
understanding. Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, and 
Hoffmeister (2007) found similar results about sen-
tential complement structures. In their research, ToM 
abilities and language skills were studied in deaf 
children who use either American Sign Language (ASL) 
or oral English, with hearing parents or deaf parents. 
The study included 176 children with a profound 
hearing loss divided in three groups: children being 
educated orally, deaf children with hearing families 
learning American Sign Language (ASL), and deaf 
children with deaf families exposed to ASL from birth. 
The study revealed that there was a significant delay 
on ToM tasks in deaf children of hearing parents, 
who typically demonstrate language delays, regard-
less of whether they used spoken English or ASL. In 
contrast, deaf children from deaf families performed 
identically to same-aged hearing controls. Both vocab-
ulary and understanding syntactic complements were 
significant independent predictors of success on verbal 
and low-verbal ToM tasks. The study also revealed 
that the language skills in the deaf children were di-
rectly related to their Theory of Mind skills. However, 
it wasn’t the children’s general language skills but 
rather vocabulary skills and the specific ability to com-
prehend syntactic complements that predicted Theory 
of Mind skills.
In spite of the facts summarized here, some studies 
have questioned the role of sentential complements 
in false belief understanding. They have argued that 
semantics, not syntax, predict children’s scores in 
ToM tasks (Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & 
Garnham, 2003), or that some more general linguis-
tic abilities are better predictors of false belief under-
standing (Slade & Ruffman, 2005). A different line of 
evidence that has cast doubt on the centrality of lin-
guistic complements for false belief understanding 
comes from the study of their relation in different lan-
guages (Perner, Sprung, Zauner, & Haider, 2003; Tardif & 
Wellman, 2000).
Among the attempts to contrast the sentential 
complement hypothesis with alternative explanations, 
two training studies stand out (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 
2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Hale and Tager-
Flusberg (2003) found that sentential complement 
training led to improvement in various ToM tasks. 
Furthermore, the influence was specific, given that 
the same effect did not occur with subjects trained in 
other types of sentences such as those including rela-
tive clauses. It is important to point out that, as a result 
of only using verbs of communication during senten-
tial complement training, the ToM progress observed 
in the post-test could not be assumed to be an effect 
of learning the significance of specific mental con-
tent verbs.
Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) provide further sup-
port for the importance of complementation for the 
development of ToM. They tested the influence of two 
main variables related to false belief understanding: 
the confrontation of one’s own perspective with a 
different perspective in discursive interaction, and the 
understanding of sentential complements with mental 
and communication verbs. Lohmann and Tomasello 
(2003) found that the most effective condition for 
promoting ToM progress was that which brought 
together all the variables mentioned. On the other hand, 
the condition in which only the deceptive nature of 
the experience was emphasized, without any verbal 
recourse, did not produce significant pre-post differ-
ences. Furthermore, false-belief understanding of both 
children trained in sentence complementation and 
children trained in the confrontation of perspectives 
improved significantly.
In addition to the approaches discussed above, some 
studies have shown that other aspects of language, 
apart from conversational interaction and syntactic 
abilities, are related to the development of ToM. For 
instance, Doherty (2000), Happé (1995) and Schick 
et al. (2007) found that receptive vocabulary is related 
to ToM. Other authors have discovered a relation-
ship between having alternative names for objects and 
false belief understanding (Meins & Fernyhough, 2007; 
Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). In fact, 
one theoretical proposal holds that the ability to con-
sider multiple names for objects precedes false belief 
understanding (Jacques & Zelazo, 2005a). Therefore, 
receptive vocabulary skills, and also the understanding 
of synonymy (i.e., having alternative names for objects 
such category names, fruit or apple) have been related 
to the ToM, though no training studies have focused 
specifically on naming objects from more than one 
perspective.
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The review of existent research established that 
language influences false belief understanding. There 
is evidence to suggest that the discursive input to 
which the child is exposed plays a crucial role in 
promoting false belief understanding. Some training 
studies show that it is not necessary to use commu-
nication or mental state verbs, or mental terms, to 
provoke progress in ToM tasks. In addition, there is 
also a specific type of sentence structure (i.e., senten-
tial complements), which has been proven to be impor-
tant in false belief understanding. In the present study 
we examine in detail the role of two aspects of language 
that have been strongly linked to false belief under-
standing: the syntax of complementation and the 
perspective-shifting discourse. We start from the basic 
premise that training studies are the most appropriate 
approach to this question, and will use a procedure 
adapted from Lohmann and Tomasello (2003).
On the one hand, we assume that training in sen-
tential complement sentences improves false belief 
understanding, as demonstrated by Hale and Tager-
Flusberg (2003) and Lohmann and Tomasello (2003). 
However, in this type of sentences, the semantic and 
syntactic characteristics overlap so that it is difficult 
to distinguish which one is responsible for improve-
ments in ToM. In that sense, as Milligan et al. (2007) 
have suggested, “training studies could further sep-
arate the semantic and syntactic elements of sentential 
complement training in order to discover whether 
the effect is primarily due to falsity or to embedded 
syntax” (p.641). Taking into account that ‘falsity’ here 
refers to the semantic aspect, Milligan et al.’s proposal 
can be carried out using sentential complement sen-
tences where the subordinate clauses are true and 
not false. Therefore, in the present study we attempt 
to separate the semantic from the syntactic aspects in 
sentential complement training using non-deceptive 
objects. Thus, the first objective of our study is to 
identify whether the effects of sentential complement 
training on children’s false belief understanding are 
due to the syntactic structure of the syntax of com-
plementation or to the semantic aspects derived from 
using non-deceptive objects. In line with de Villiers’s 
(2005) proposal that it is children’s mastery of false 
complements that promotes false belief understanding, 
our first prediction is that sentential complement 
training with non-deceptive objects will not improve 
children’s false belief understanding, because in this 
training true complement clauses will be used. If this 
prediction is confirmed, our results compared with 
those obtained in prior studies will show that senten-
tial complement training is only effective when false 
complement clauses are used, and therefore, that it is 
mainly the falsity and not the embedded syntax what 
fosters children’s understanding of false beliefs.
On the other hand, the perspective-shifting dis-
course has been proven to be effective in the under-
standing of false belief (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). 
In the present study we assume that perspective-
shifting discourse contributes to improve false belief 
understanding. However, it must be remembered that 
in conversational training the deceptive objects are 
labelled. So, bearing in mind that different studies 
have related having alternative names for the same 
reality to false belief understanding, it is possible 
that the aspect of the conversation which fosters 
false belief understanding is the giving of alternative 
names to deceptive objects. In this sense, the second 
objective of our study is to investigate the possible 
influence of labelling on the development of false 
belief understanding. In order to address this issue, 
in our study we will compare discourse-based training 
with object-labelling training. Our second prediction 
is that training based on labelling objects according 
to different perspectives will improve children’s un-
derstanding of false beliefs, as prior research has 




Participants included 104 normally developing pre-
school children (Mage = 3.7. range = 3.5 – 3.11) from 
different socio-cultural backgrounds in the Girona 
area of Spain. Four criteria were used to include sub-
jects in the sample: a) they were between 3 years and 
5 months old and 3 years and 11 months old; b) they 
were Catalan speakers; c) they had normal language 
development according to the Peabody Vocabulary 
Test (Dunn, Padilla, Lugo, & Dunn, 1986); and d) they 
did not respond correctly to a representational change 
task (false belief pre-test). Apart from the 104 partic-
ipants, a total of 43 children were interviewed but 
were excluded from the study for the following rea-
sons: 18 of them did not reach a score within their 
normative age range (according to the PPVT); 15 
responded correctly to both test questions in the 
pre-test representational change task; and 10 of them 
missed training sessions.
The children in the study participated in a total of 
five sessions: one pre-test, three training sessions, and 
one post-test session. The pre-test tasks were adminis-
tered in the first session. The training sessions started 
three or four days after the pre-test, and each session 
took place three or four days after the previous ses-
sion. Finally, three or four days after the last training 
session, the post-test was carried out. The training 
sessions were different in each experimental condition, 
as described in the procedure section.
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Materials and scoring
Pre-test material
Children were tested individually in three pre-test 
tasks.
Peabody Vocabulary Test. Children were administered 
the TVIP, which is based on the PPVT (Dunn et al., 
1986). This test was used to determine if they had a 
normal linguistic development.
False Belief Pre-test. A version of Gopnik and 
Astington’s (1988) representational change (RC) task 
was used to test children’s false belief knowledge. In 
our study, an egg box was shown to the children and 
they were asked: “What is inside the box?” Then, the 
box was opened and the children could see there 
were coins instead of eggs inside. Afterwards, they 
were asked the representational change question: “What 
did you think was inside the box when you first saw 
it?” After closing the box with the coins inside, the 
children were asked the false belief prediction ques-
tion: “If we show this box all closed up to a friend of 
yours, what will he/she think is in the box?” One 
point was given for correct answers to each of the last 
two questions. Children with two points were elimi-
nated from the sample.
Sentential Complement Pre-test. Considering that one 
training condition included sentential complement 
sentences, it was important to ensure the children 
had a similar understanding of this kind of sentence. 
If the group trained in sentential complement sentences 
had, at the outset, a higher or lower level of under-
standing of the syntax of complementation than the 
other group, this might have affected the results.
The children were thus given two sentential comple-
ment pre-tests:
1) A version of the Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) 
task which consisted of telling the children stories 
accompanied by two drawings. In the first picture 
the protagonist performed one activity but in the 
second picture claimed to have performed a dif-
ferent activity. The children were then asked two 
test questions, one referring to what the protago-
nist said and the other to what the protagonist 
really did. Three stories were used in our study. 
Children were given 1 point for each correct answer, 
so the maximum score in this task was 6 points.
2) An adaptation of the Lohmann and Tomasello 
(2003) task intended to assess children’s under-
standing of false belief. In this case, three illus-
trated stories were shown to the children. In each 
story the protagonist hold a false belief, and chil-
dren were asked two questions, one referring to 
the protagonist’s behaviour and the other con-
cerning the protagonist’s thoughts. One point was 
awarded for each correct answer. A total of 6 points 
was possible for this task. Thus, the maximum 
score for the two sentential complement tasks to-
gether was 12 points. Some examples of the senten-
tial complement tasks have been included in the 
Appendix A.
Training material
Children meeting the pre-test criteria were assigned 
to one of three experimental conditions or to the con-
trol condition. In each of three sessions, the experi-
menter showed four objects to the children. In two of 
the experimental conditions and in the control con-
dition, three deceptive objects and one non-deceptive 
object were used in each session. At first sight, the 
deceptive objects seemed to be one thing (i.e. a tomato), 
but when observed closely a different function was 
evident (i.e. the tomato is really a candle). Conversely, 
the non-deceptive objects had the same function as 
their appearance suggested. A total of nine deceptive 
and three non-deceptive objects were used during 
training, except in the Sentential complements with 
non-deceptive objects condition, where all the objects 
were non-deceptive. A Little Red Riding Hood puppet 
(from now on puppet) was used by the experimenter 
to interact with the children in all conditions. The four 
conditions are explained in greater detail in the pro-
cedure section.
Post-test material
Four different tasks were used in the post-test.
An adaptation of the Change of Location Task 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This task consisted of telling 
the children a story using toys. The instructions were 
as follows: “Jordi and Mariona are playing with a ball. 
They decide to hide the ball in a yellow box. Then, 
Jordi leaves the room. While he is away, Mariona takes 
the ball from the yellow box and puts it in a blue box. 
After that, Jordi comes back.” Then the children were 
asked a prediction question: “Where will Jordi first 
look for the ball?” When the children said or pointed 
to the yellow box, they were given 1 point.
A version of the Appearance-Reality Task (Flavell, 
1986). Deceptive objects similar to the ones in the 
training were used. These objects involved a discrep-
ancy between the real and the apparent identity. First, 
the experimenter showed each object by its apparent 
side, and asked: “What does it look like?” If the child 
did not answer correctly, the experimenter told the 
child what the object looked like (i.e. “It looks like a 
tomato.”). After that, the experimenter let the child 
see the real function of the object and asked: “And 
now, what is it really?” In case the child gave a wrong 
answer, the experimenter told the child what the object 
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really was (i.e. “It is really a candle.”). Afterwards, 
the puppet appeared on the scene and the experi-
menter introduced her to the child. Then, the exper-
imenter took the object by its apparent side (i.e. hiding 
that it was a candle) and asked the child a test pre-
diction question: “If we ask the puppet what it looks 
like, what will she say?” Finally, the real identity of 
the object was disclosed and the experimenter asked: 
“And now, if we ask the puppet what this really is, 
what will she say?” One point was given when the 
children correctly answered each prediction question. 
Thus, a score of 2 was possible for each object.
A Representational Change Task similar to the one used 
in the pre-test but with a different object. Specifically, 
we used a Smarties tube containing tiny stones instead 
of sweets. The same two test questions used in the pre-
test were asked. A score of 2 was possible in this case.
The scores of all the false belief post-test tasks were 
added to obtain a global false belief post-test score: 
1 point was given for a correct answer in the change of 
location task, 2 points were given for answering cor-
rectly the two questions in the representational change 
task, and since the appearance-reality task included 
three objects, the total score for this task was divided 
by three, giving a maximum score of 2 points. So the 
three false belief post-tests tasks had a maximum score 
of 5 points.
Procedure
Three adult experimenters conducted the pre-test, the 
training sessions and the post-test. Children were 
tested individually in a quiet room in their nursery 
schools. In the first session the pre-test tasks were 
administrated. Pre-test sessions lasted about 20 minutes. 
Children passing the pre-test were randomly assigned 
to one of the four groups. After three or four days, 
the training sessions started. Training sessions lasted 
about 10 minutes and were separated by three or 
four days. A total of three training sessions were 
conducted. Finally, three or four days after the last 
session, children were given a post-test. The post-test 
session lasted about 25 minutes. The design of the 
training sessions varied according to experimental 
conditions. The four conditions are described in more 
detail below and are summarized in Table 1. (See the 
Appendix A for an example of each training condition.)
Discourse training group (DIS group). In this condi-
tion, the deceptive aspect of the objects was mentioned 
in a communicative exchange without using mental 
state verbs or sentential complement constructions. 
First, we showed the deceptive part of the object to the 
children (i.e. a tomato) and asked them what it was. 
The children always answered incorrectly (i.e. a tomato), 
because the real identity of the object was hidden to 
them. After that, the experimenter told the children 
that the object looked like one thing (i.e. “Ok, it looks 
like a tomato. But look carefully”) and showed them the 
hidden part of the object (i.e. a candle). Then, the 
experimenter asked the children what the object really 
was. The children were corrected when they answered 
wrongly.
Afterwards, the puppet came to visit the children. 
We showed the apparent aspect of the object to the 
puppet (i.e. a tomato) and asked the children what the 
puppet would say when we asked her what the object 
was, using communicative verbs. The experimenter 
repeated the children’s answer. After that, the exper-
imenter said to the puppet what the object really was 
(i.e. “Look puppet, it’s a candle!”). The puppet did not 
believe the experimenter (i.e. “A candle? No, it’s a tomato, 
I’ve seen it!”). Then the experimenter showed the puppet 
the hidden part of the object and told her again what 
the object really was. The puppet showed surprise. 
Afterwards, the experimenter asked the children again 
what the puppet would say when asked what the 
object really was. If the children answered wrongly by 
saying the deceptive label of the object (i.e. “a tomato”), 
the experimenter corrected them (i.e. “A tomato? No, 
now the puppet will say a candle, Ok?”), and suggested 
that the children should listen to the puppet’s answer. 
The puppet’s answer corresponded to the hidden 
part of the object (“It’s a candle!”).
Labelling training group (LAB group). As in the pre-
vious condition, the deceptive aspect of the objects 
was mentioned without using sentential complement 
constructions. No communicative or mental state verbs 
were used either. As in the case of the discourse con-
dition, the deceptive part of the object was made 
obvious. However, in the labelling condition the 
children were not asked about the real and apparent 
identity of the object. Instead, they were shown labels, 
and were mere observers of the experimenter. First, 
the children were shown the apparent identity of the 
object and the experimenter stated its label (i.e. “Look X, 
a tomato”). Afterwards, the experimenter showed 
and labelled the real identity of the object (“Now look, 
a candle”). This part was done three times. Later, the 
puppet appeared on the scene. The experimenter 
showed the apparent identity of the object to the 
puppet, and the puppet labelled the object’s appearance 
(i.e. “A tomato!”). Then, the experimenter showed 
the real identity of the object and the puppet stated 
its label showing surprise, when the real identity of 
the object was made obvious (“Oh! A candle!”). The part 
where the puppet arrived was not repeated.
Sentential complements with non-deceptive objects group 
(SND group). In this condition the experimenter used 
mental and communicative verbs, and also sentential 
complements. However, in this case the objects were 
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not deceptive (i.e. a candle with the typical round 
shape of a candle). First, the experimenter showed 
the object and asked the children what they thought it 
was. If the children gave a wrong answer, the ques-
tion was repeated.
When the children gave a correct answer (i.e. “a can-
dle”), the experimenter asked two questions about the 
characteristics of the objects (i.e. “Do you think that 
this candle is soft or hard?”). Children’s responses could 
be right or wrong, but the experimenter always con-
gratulated them (i.e. “Very good, you think that the candle 
is hard / soft”). Afterwards, the puppet appeared and 
performed an action with the object (i.e. “Look at me, 
I can hold up the candle!”). Next, the experimenter 
asked the children what the puppet had shown she 
could do. If the children responded incorrectly, the 
experimenter corrected them (i.e. “She showed us that 
she can hold up the candle”). If the children answered 
correctly, the experimenter repeated their words. After 
that, the puppet made a comment about the object 
(i.e. “Oh, the candle is burning! Oh, I’ve burned myself!”) 
and the experimenter asked what the puppet had said. 
As before, children were corrected after a wrong 
answer (i.e. “She said that she had burned herself.”) and 
their words were repeated after a correct answer. 
Finally, the experimenter asked a question about the 
puppet’s knowledge of the object (i.e. “Does the puppet 
know that the candle is dangerous?”) and asked how she 
knew this. Wrong answers were corrected and right 
answers were repeated.
Control group (CON group). In this condition, the 
deceptive parts of the objects were shown, but no 
language was used, except for certain expressions to 
direct the children’s attention. The children were just 
observers. First the experimenter showed the chil-
dren the deceptive part of the object and said: “Look!” 
Then, the experimenter showed the hidden part of 
the object, while showing surprise, and said: “But now 
look!” This part was repeated twice more. Later, the 
puppet arrived and the experimenter showed her the 
object’s deceptive side: “Puppet, look!” The puppet 
answered: “Oh!” After that, the experimenter showed 
the puppet the hidden part of the object: “And now, 
puppet, look again.” The puppet reacted in surprise: 
“Oh!” The part of the training involving the puppet 
was not repeated.
Results
We divided the results section into three parts. In the 
first part, we analyzed differences among training 
groups at the pre-test using the Kruskal-Wallis and 
Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests and the Chi-
square test. In the second part, we compared the per-
formance on the different theory of mind post-test 
tasks. The Kruskal-Wallis and the Mann-Whitney tests 
were conducted to compare performance on the rep-
resentational change and appearance-reality tasks. A 
Chi-square test was used to analyze performance on 
the change of location task as score on this task was 
a dichotomous variable. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was used to examine between-group differences for 
the aggregate false belief task scores. In the third 
part, we used the Wilcoxon non-parametric test to 
investigate whether the training led to significant 
changes in the scores obtained in the representational 
change task. Furthermore, the improvement in the rep-
resentational change task (the difference between the 
post-test and the pre-test scores) was compared among 
the different groups using the Mann-Whitney test.
Analyses of Group Differences at Pre-test
Chi-square (for the false belief pre-test score and the 
sex variable) and Kruskal-Wallis analyses were con-
ducted to check for between-group differences in the 
pre-test scores. The results are shown in Table 2. There 
Table 1. Characteristics of the training groups
Elements in the training
Training condition Objects Syntax Verbs
Discourse Deceptive experience Simple clauses Communication verbs. No mental 
 state verbs
Labelling Deceptive experience Only vocatives and  
 attention-getting expressions
No communication or mental  
 state verbs
Sentential complements No deception Complement sentences Mental state and communication  
 verbs
Control Deceptive experience Only vocatives and  
 attention-getting expressions
Only imperative ‘look’
Note: Adapted from Lohmann and Tomasello (2003)
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were no significant group differences for age, χ23 = 
4.308, p = .230; sex, χ23 = .427, p = .935; false belief 
pre-test score, χ23 = 2.140, p = .544; sentential comple-
ment pre-test score, χ23 = 4.199, p = .241, or Peabody 
test score, χ23 = 3.601, p = .308.
Results of the post-test tasks
The scores in the different post-test tasks were com-
pared for the different training groups (see Table 3 and 
Figure 1).
For the representational change task, the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test showed significant dif-
ferences between the labelling group and the other 
three groups, DIS: Z = −2.76, p = .006; SND: Z = −3.55, 
p < .001; CON: Z = −3.404, p = .001. However, there 
were no significant differences between the discourse 
and the SND group, Z = −1.038, p = .299, between the 
discourse group and the control group, Z = −.814, 
p = .416, or between the SND group and the control 
group, Z = −.237, p = .813.
For the appearance-reality task we found a dif-
ferent pattern. The Kruskall-Wallis test revealed sig-
nificant differences among training groups, χ23 = 13.478, 
p = .004. The Mann-Whitney test showed that differ-
ences were significant between the labelling group 
and the SND and the discourse groups, SND: Z = −3.21, 
p = .001; DIS: Z = −3.05, p = .002, but no differences 
were found between the control group and the other 
groups (p > .05). Also, we found no significant differ-
ences between the discourse and the SND group, 
Z = −.497, p = .619. Thus, subjects in the labelling 
group outperformed the other three groups in the 
representational change task, but in the appearance-
reality tasks they outperformed the discourse group 
and the complement sentences group only.
Concerning the change of location task, we found 
significant differences as a function of condition, χ23 = 
14.083, p = .003. Pair-wise comparisons showed that 
the LAB group was significantly better than the other 
three groups, SND: χ21 = 6.470, p = .011; DIS: χ21 = 3.820, 
p = .051; CON: χ21 = 12.235, p = .001, whereas the 
difference between the DIS and the SND groups was 
not significant, χ21 = .391, p = .532. Similarly, the dif-
ferences between the control group with the DIS and 
the SND groups were not significant (p > .05).
An ANOVA was conducted to compare the aggre-
gate false belief task scores. Results showed differ-
ences among the different conditions, F = 9, 287, p < .001. 
A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the differences 
were significant between the labelling and the other 
three groups, DIS: p = .001; SND: p < .001; CON: p < .001. 










Age in months 43.62 (1.86) 43.19 (1.96) 42.92 (1.62) 43.81 (1.67)
Sex* 0.54 (.51) 0.58 (.50) 0.58 (.50) 0.50 (0.51)
FB pre-test** 0.31 (.47) 0.27 (.45) 0.42 (.50) 0.42 (.50)
SC pre-test*** 5.50 (2.42) 6.04 (1.99) 6.15 (1.83) 5.62 (1.58)
Peabody 25.25 (4.37) 28.93 (9.36) 30.50 (3.54) 24.68 (3.04)
Note: *Proportion of girls
**Maximum score = 1
***Maximum score = 12










Change of location (0–1) .31 (.47) .58 (.50) .23 (.43) .12 (.33)
Representational change (0–2) .73 (.72) 1.31 (.68) .54 (.71) .58 (.70)
Appearance-Reality (0–6) 4.58 (1.30) 5.58 (.81) 4.81 (.89) 5.19 (1.02)
Sum of False Belief Tasks (0–5) 2.56 (1.25) 3.74 (1) 2.37 (1.17) 2.42 (.90)
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Thus, subjects in the labelling condition did better than 
the subjects in the other conditions on this aggregate 
score of false belief understanding (see Figure 1.).
Training effects: comparison of pre-test and post-test 
scores
The effects of each kind of training on false belief were 
assessed using the Wilcoxon non-parametric test and 
comparing the pre-test and post-test scores for the rep-
resentational change task (RC) (see Table 4).
Both in the discourse and in the labelling training 
groups, subjects improved (i.e. did better on the post-
test than on the pre-test) in the RC task, LAB: Z = −2.67, 
p = .008; p = .803; DIS: Z = −3.95, p < .001. Conversely, 
subjects in the SND and in the control group did not 
show any improvement, SND: Z = −.90, p = .366; 
CON: Z = −1.000, p = .317. In sum, in the representa-
tional change tasks, subjects increased their scores 
from pre-test to post-test in the discourse and labelling 
groups (see Figure 2).
When we compared the improvement in the repre-
sentational change task (post-test minus pre-test scores) 
between the different conditions (using the Kruskal-
Wallis test), we found that there was a significant 
difference, χ23 = 20.837, p < .001. When this comparison 
was made group by group using the Mann-Whitney 
test, a significant difference was revealed between the 
improvement in the labelling group and the improve-
ment in the other three training groups, DIS: Z = −2.68, 
p = .007; SND: Z = −4.01, p < .001; CON: Z = −3.54, 
p < .001. However, there were no significant differ-
ences between the discourse and the SND, Z = −1.81, 
p = .070, and the CON, Z = −1.33, p = .182, training 
groups. No significant difference existed between the 
SND and the CON training groups, Z = −.249, p = .803.
Discussion
Replicating findings from training studies (e.g., 
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003), the present study found 
that the children in the discourse training group 
improved on the representational change task from the 
pre-test to the post-test. With regard to the two dis-
tinctive conditions of our study, the children from 
the labelling condition also improved their performance 
on the representational change task from the pre-test 
to the post-test, while the children trained in senten-
tial complements with non-deceptive objects did not 
show any significant progress. Therefore, the training 
carried out in the discourse and labelling conditions 
improved children’s performance on the representa-
tional change task. However, when we compare the 
post-test results between groups, the participants in 
the labelling condition improved significantly more 
than the other groups. The same pattern of findings 
emerged for the change of location task, which was 
not used in the pre-test or in the training. With respect 
to this task, children in the labelling condition per-
formed superior to those in the other conditions. We can 
therefore assume that labelling training is more effec-
tive in improving false belief understanding than the 
other types of training.
In our study, the group trained in sentential com-
plements with non-deceptive objects does not show 
any improvement in the representational change task, 
and obtains the lowest score of all the groups for the 
aggregate false belief score. These results, in conjunc-
tion with the studies showing the efficacy of the training 








Figure 1. Sum of False Belief Tasks as a function of condition.










Representational change pre-test (0–2) .31 (.47) .27 (.45) .42 (.50) .42 (.50)
Representational change post-test (0–2) .73 (.72) 1.31 (.68) .54 (.71) .58 (.70)
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(Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Hale & Tager-Flugsberg, 
2003), indicate that what causes improvement in false 
belief understanding is not the syntax of comple-
mentation alone, or the exposure to mental state or 
communication verbs, but rather the confrontation 
with a specific deceptive reality in which there is a 
double perspective: saying or thinking that an object 
is one thing while it is really something else. If this 
confrontation does not exist, the sentential comple-
ment syntax, despite the presence of mental state 
verbs or communication verbs, does not promote the 
development of false belief understanding.
As we have suggested above, a possible explanation 
of why the children trained in sentential comple-
ments with non-deceptive objects did not experience 
an improvement in false belief understanding is that 
they were not shown deceptive objects. However, it 
is important to consider here the results from the 
control group together with the results from the “no 
language” condition in Lohmann and Tomasello’s 
(2003) study. In these conditions, the children were 
trained with deceptive objects, and no language was 
used, apart from some interjections and words to direct 
attention. Children’s performance in false belief tasks 
did not improve following training, which strongly 
suggests that, apart from the exposure to deceptive 
objects, children need language to improve their false 
belief understanding. In other words, in order to de-
velop their false belief understanding, both linguis-
tic training and deceptive objects are required. In fact, 
these results are consistent with the hypotheses of 
de Villiers (2005), who argues that it is children’s mastery 
of false complements –and not of true ones as in our 
study– what promotes false belief understanding.
On the other hand, in our labelling condition, under 
very similar circumstances to those in the control 
group or in the “no language condition” of Lohmann 
and Tomasello (2003), and only adding the two possible 
labels for the reality and appearance of the object, 
there is a considerable improvement in false belief 
understanding. These results of the effect of labelling 
are rather surprising since previous studies did not 
indicate that labelling was the aspect of language 
that had the most notable impact on progress in false 
belief understanding. Some studies certainly produced 
data that were compatible with ours, but they were 
related to synonymy or to vocabulary skills. For Perner 
et al. (2002), the aspect of vocabulary that correlated 
most strongly with false belief performance was the 
ability to understand synonyms. Other studies, such 
as those carried out by Ruffman et al. (2003) and 
Schick et al. (2007) also demonstrate a significant rela-
tionship between semantics/vocabulary and false belief 
understanding. In any case, general vocabulary and 
synonymy are measures that, in some respects, are 
tapping into aspects of linguistic ability similar to 
the double labelling of a deceptive object. However, 
in other respects, they differ from double labelling. 
Although an object can have more than one name, 
being two different things, depending on whether 
its appearance or its function is considered, is a com-
pletely different matter. We do not know if training 
in the double labelling of a non-deceptive object 
(synonymy) would lead to an improvement in false 
belief understanding. This is an aspect that could be 
tested in future studies.
Even though the data from our study on the effects 
of labelling on false belief understanding lead us to 
consider that there is an aspect of labelling which is 
important for improving it, we must also remember 
that, in the study by Lohmann and Tomasello (2003), 
the condition in which the complementation and the 
discourse syntax were joined promoted the largest 
improvement in false belief understanding. It is there-
fore possible that what is most favourable to false 
belief understanding is the emphasis on the double 
perspective of objects, which can be transmitted in 
different ways, although always through the medium 
of language. The labelling condition, even though the 
communicative load is unidirectional, is sufficient to 
capture the essence of conversational input in relation 
to false belief understanding: conceiving of a single 
object from more than one perspective.
That said, and taking into consideration that decep-
tive objects are also labelled in the discourse condition, 
a critical question is why labelling has such a signif-
icant effect. If object labelling is found in both the label-
ling and the discourse conditions, why does training 
work better in the labelling condition? It should be 
remembered here that, in the discourse condition, 
the children participated in a conversational interac-
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Figure 2. Pre-test vs. post-test scores on representational 
change task.
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labels were conveyed, the double perspective was 
emphasized and the participants were included in 
a conversation. For its part, the labelling condition was 
a passive condition for the participants, who only 
observed and heard what the experimenter told them 
about the objects, but in which the two possible object 
labels were also emphasized. Thus, in both conditions 
the objects are labelled according to a double perspec-
tive and their deceptive character is emphasized. A pos-
sible explanation for the differences between them is 
that the labelling condition is more informative for 
the children since it isolates other aspects of the situ-
ation. In this way, no other linguistic elements have 
to be considered, which can make it difficult for the 
children to know what they have to pay attention to. 
It thus makes it easier for them to focus on what is 
critical, i.e. the deceptive character of the objects (in 
other words, their double perspective).
The theoretical perspective that best corresponds 
to the results of this study is one that assumes that 
an aspect of language (labelling) plays a decisive role 
in the development of cognitive flexibility, i.e. the ability 
to simultaneously consider multiple but conflictive 
representations of a single object or event (Jacques & 
Zelazo, 2005a). According to these authors, cognitive 
flexibility plays a central role in the development of 
ToM, and all the measures of false belief require cog-
nitive flexibility. Jacques and Zelazo’s (2005a) sugges-
tion that labelling is effective, makes sense since the 
critical point is to conceive –signal, make obvious, 
note– different points of view, or representations of a 
single phenomenon, object or event. In some way, 
the proposals made by Tomasello (1999) and Harris 
(2005), which emphasize that a discourse that allows 
for different perspectives with respect to a single object 
or event is enough to produce improvements in ToM 
tasks, would also be compatible with the previous idea. 
The role of labelling in cognitive flexibility is there-
fore discussed in greater detail.
The labelling condition from our study includes 
the alternative naming investigated by Perner et al. 
(2002) and Meins and Fernyhough (2007). However, 
our condition also includes a conflict between the 
labels used to name the objects. In fact, whereas in 
the alternative naming system both labels are true 
(i.e. rabbit and bunny), in our condition the labels were 
opposite (if it is a candle it cannot be a tomato). This 
type of labelling is better adjusted to the executive 
function called cognitive flexibility. Labelling has been 
widely used to investigate the influence of language 
on executive functions, and more specifically, on cog-
nitive flexibility (Jacques & Zelazo, 2005a; Müller, 
Jacques, Brocki, & Zelazo, 2009). In this sense, two kinds 
of measures have been used to evaluate cognitive flexi-
bility: inductive and deductive tasks. These measures 
differ in the amount of information provided to chil-
dren. In deductive measures all the information 
necessary to solve a task is provided to the children, 
and they simply need to use this information appro-
priately. On the other hand, in the case of inductive 
measures, the child does not receive all the information 
needed to solve the task, and has to infer it inductively. 
We can give an example of the distinction between a 
deductive and an inductive task in the form of two 
cognitive flexibility tasks. In the Dimensional Change 
Card Sort (DCCS), the children have to pair targets 
according to featural similarities, and the criterion of 
selection (e.g. colour) is given to the children. What they 
have to do is therefore to apply a given rule (deduce). 
In another task, the Flexible Item Selection Task (FIST), 
the children also have to pair targets according to 
featural similarities, but in this case the criterion is 
not explicit. Thus, the children here have to induce 
the criterion needed to solve the task (see Jacques & 
Zelazo, 2005b). In fact, despite that labelling training 
is not used to assess the children, we could say that 
it is a form of deductive training because the children 
receive all the information needed to understand the 
two perspectives of objects.
The effect of labelling has consistently been related 
to inductive measures (see Jacques & Zelazo, 2005b 
for a revision), while the results obtained using deduc-
tive measures are more inconsistent. For example, in a 
study with the DCCS, Kirkham, Cruess and Diamond 
(2003) found that labelling improves the performance 
of the task, while other research (Müller, Zelazo, Lurye, & 
Lieberman, 2008; Towse, Redbond, Houston-Price, & 
Cook, 2000), did not find such an effect. On the other 
hand, Müller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone, & Rohrer (2004), 
using another deductive paradigm, also found that 
three-year-olds improved their performance in the 
task when they were asked to use labelling. However, 
there are probably other factors, in addition to task 
format, which can affect the effectiveness of labelling.
In a discussion of the studies designed to investi-
gate the effects of language on children’s executive 
functions, Müller et al. (2009) examined different possi-
bilities about the role of labelling in cognitive flexibility. 
They concluded that labelling could be differentially 
effective at different stages of attentional processing. 
Specifically, due to labelling, “children must be capable 
of quickly disengaging attention from one attribute 
and engaging attention to a different attribute (…). 
The increased attentional flexibility then would be a 
prerequisite for the coordination of lower order rules 
in a higher order system” (Müller et al., 2009, p. 65). 
In relation to our study, it is plausible that providing 
a label in the appearance-reality training could shift 
children’s attention to the relevant stimulus dimension. 
This is indeed related to what we said before: labelling 
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makes it easier for the children to focus on what is 
critical, the double perspective of deceptive objects.
In short, according to our data, various aspects of 
language can influence or promote progress in false 
belief understanding, as long as they are related to a 
reality that allows more than one perspective. The rea-
sons why some aspects of language are more strongly 
related to false belief understanding than others, and 
whether there are other aspects that might also have an 
influence, need to be studied in greater depth.
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An example of each kind of sentential complements 
task is given.
Communicative Verbs task
Drawing 1: “Marc is playing with cars.”
Drawing 2: “Later, his mother arrives and asks him: 
“Marc, what were you doing?” Marc answers: “I was play-
ing with a ball.” Then, Marc goes away.”
Test question 1: “What did Marc say he was playing with?”
Test question 2: “What was Marc really and truly play-
ing with?”
Belief Verbs task
Drawing 1: “Raquel is at her home right now. She wants 
to play with a ball outside.”
Drawing 2: “Raquel thinks that it is still daytime.”
Drawing 3: “But it is really and truly dark outside.”
Drawing 4: Test question 1: “Will Raquel go outside to 
play with the ball?”
Test question 2:“What did Raquel think first, that it was 
daytime or night-time?
Training procedures
Example of a Discourse training session
The experimenter shows the deceptive part of the 
object and asks:
E: “What is this?”
Child: “It’s a tomato.”
E: “Ok, it looks like a tomato. But look carefully.”
Then the experimenter shows the hidden part of the 
object:
E: “What is it really?”
- Child: “It’s a tomato!” Ò E: “Ok, it looks like a tomato. 
But look carefully, it’s a candle! What is it really? (If the 
child says “a tomato”, the experimenter repeats this sen-
tence another time)
When the child answers “a candle”, the training 
continues.
A puppet appears and sees the deceptive part of the 
object:
Then, the experimenter asks the child:
“When I ask the puppet what is this, what will she say?”
- If the child answers: “a candle” Ò E: “a candle?”
- If the child answers: “a tomato” Ò E: “a tomato?”
E: “Let’s hear what the puppet says. Look puppet, 
I have a candle.”
Puppet: “A candle? No, it’s a tomato, I’ve seen it!”
Then the experimenter shows the puppet the hidden 
part of the object:
E: “What?! Look puppet, it’s a candle!”
Puppet: “Oh!” (surprised)
E: “Now, when I ask the puppet what is it really, what will 
she say?”
- If the child answers: “a candle” Ò E: “a candle? Very 
good!”
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- If the child answers: “a tomato” Ò E: “a tomato? No, 
now the puppet will say a candle, Ok?”
E: “Ok, let’s hear what the puppet says. Puppet, what is it 
really?”
Puppet: “It’s a candle!”
Example of a Labelling training session
The experimenter shows the deceptive part of the 
object and says:
E: “Look X, a tomato.”
Then the experimenter shows the hidden part of the 
object:
E: “Now look, a candle.”
This part of the training is done three times.
Then, a Little Red Riding Hood puppet appears and 
sees the deceptive part of the object:
E: “Look puppet!”
Puppet: “A tomato!”
After that, the experimenter shows to the puppet the 
hidden part of the object:
E: “Now look!”
Puppet: “Oh! A candle!”
The part when the puppet arrives is not repeated.
Example of a Sentential complements with non-
deceptive objects training session
The experimenter shows the object:
E: “What do you think this is?”
Child: “A candle.” Ò E: “Very good, you think that it is a 
candle.”
Child: Another answer Ò E: “What do you think this is?”
E: “Do you think that this candle is soft or hard?”
Child: “Hard.” Ò E: “Very good, you think that this candle 
is hard.”
Child: “Soft.” Ò E: “Very good, you think that this candle 
is soft.”
E: Do you think that this candle can be burned?
Child: “Yes.” Ò E: “Very good, you think that this candle 
can be burned.”
Child: “No.” Ò E: “Very good, you think that this candle 
cannot be burned.”
The puppet appears and sees the object:
Puppet: “Look at me, I can hold up the candle!”
E: “What has the puppet shown that she can do?”
Child: “That she can hold up the candle.” Ò E: “Very 
good, she showed us that she can hold up the candle.”
Child: Another answer Ò E: “She showed us that she 
can hold up the candle.”
Puppet: “Oh, the candle is burning! Oh, I burned 
myself!”
E: “What did the puppet say?”
Child: “That she burned herself.” Ò E: “Very good, she 
said that she had burned herself.”
Child: Another answer Ò E: “She said that she had 
burned herself.”
E: “Does the puppet know that the candle is dangerous?”
Child: “Yes.” Ò E: “Very good, she knows that the candle 
is dangerous.”
Child: “No.” Ò E: “She knows that the candle is 
dangerous.”
E: “How does she know this?”
Child: “Yes.” Ò E: “Very good, because she has seen that 
it burns.”
Child: Another answer Ò E: “Because she has seen that 
it burns.”
Example of a Control training session
The experimenter shows the deceptive part of the 
object:
E: “Look!”
Then, the experimenter shows the hidden part of the 
object:
E: “But now look!”
This part of the training is done three times.
Then, the puppet arrives, and the experimenter shows 
her the deceptive part of the object:
E: “Puppet, look!”
Puppet: “Oh!”
Finally, the experimenter shows the puppet the hidden 
part of the object:
E: “And now, puppet, look again.”
Puppet: “Oh!”
This part is not repeated.
